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INTRODUCTION
Previous academic work on benefit corporation reporting has
shown abysmal compliance rates with statutory requirements.1 These
studies note the near total lack of enforcement mechanisms within the
studied state statutes. This article turns its attention to the increasing
number of states that have included express punishments in their benefit
corporation statutes for reporting failures. Part I reviews the literature on
benefit corporation reporting and examines both the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation approach and the Delaware approach to the issue.
Part II summarizes and compares the statutory provisions adopted in
recent years by states to increase benefit reporting enforcement. Part III
discusses the substance of the benefit reports and provides law and
governance suggestions for improving social benefit. A brief conclusion
ends the article.
I.

THE MODEL AND DELAWARE APPROACHES TO BENEFIT
CORPORATION REPORTING

The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation (the “Model”), which
is used as the template for the majority of benefit corporation laws in the
*
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1 Maxime Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, Compliance, and
Recommendations, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 37, 94 (2018) (noting that the author’s “empirical
study of benefit reporting has shown very low reporting rates in Oregon, Colorado, and
Delaware, ranging from eight percent to fourteen percent.”); J. Haskell Murray, An Early
Report on Benefit Reports, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 25, 34 (2015) (indicating an eight percent
compliance rate among a pool of active benefit corporations in Virginia, New York,
California, and Hawaii); J. Haskell Murray, Examining Tennessee’s For-Profit Benefit
Corporation Law, 19 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 325, 340 (2017) (finding zero
percent compliance among active Tennessee for-profit benefit corporations in the first
compliance cycle after the passage of the statute); see also Joan MacLeod Heminway,
Corporate Purpose and Litigation Risk in Publicly Held U.S. Benefit Corporations, 40 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 611, 649 (2017) (noting that “compliance with benefit report filing requirements
similarly appears to be wanting.”).
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United States addresses reporting in sections 401 and 402.2 Section 401
addresses the substantive content requirements of the benefit report and
mandates the use of a third-party standard in evaluating social
performance.3 Section 402 requires public posting of the benefit report
and filing of the report with the Secretary of State.4 While most states
largely track the Model’s language, the requirement to file the benefit
report with the Secretary of State is not included in most state statutes.5
Neither Section 401 or 402 provide an express penalty for violating the
statutory reporting requirements. Presumably, a benefit enforcement
proceeding could be brought, but shareholders are the only affected
stakeholders with standing to bring such a claim.6 Even shareholders must
own, at a minimum, 2% of the benefit corporation’s stock or, in the
alternative, 5% of the benefit corporation’s parent company to bring a
lawsuit for violating the statute.7
Delaware is not only the most popular state for business formation
generally but has also managed to attract most of the largest benefit
corporations as well.8 The Delaware version of the benefit corporation
form is called a “public benefit corporation” or “PBC,” and Delaware has
the most lenient of the reporting laws.9 In Delaware, the PBC report must

MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 401–402 (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
Id. § 401; see also Brett H. McDonnell, Committing to Doing Good and Doing Well: Fiduciary
Duty in Benefit Corporations, 20 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 19, 33 (2014) (noting that
“[t]hese public reports work as a commitment device within a reputational market-based
strategy”).
4 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 402 (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
5 J. Haskell Murray, Corporate Forms of Social Enterprise: Comparing the State Statutes (Jan. 15,
2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1988556 (showing most
benefit corporation state statutes do not require filing the benefit report with the secretary
of state, even though the model legislation does).
6 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305 (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
7 Id.
8 Robert Sprague & Aaron J. Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule:
Arguments for Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 42 n.8 (2010)
(“Delaware corporate law is predominantly cited, as Delaware is the home of a majority
of large, publicly traded corporations . . . and Delaware is considered to be the most
popular state for incorporation . . . .”); Benefit Corporations Raising Capital,
https://benefitcorp.net/benefit-corporations-raising-capital (showing the benefit
corporations with the largest capital raises, most of which were incorporated in
Delaware).
9 J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Law, 4
HARV. BUS. L. REV. 345, 354 (2014).
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only be produced biennially, not annually.10 Further, Delaware PBCs are
not required to use a third-party standard in assessing social value and are
not required to publicly post their reports.11
II.

IMPROVING ENFORCEMENT OF BENEFIT CORPORATION
REPORTING

In contrast to the Model and Delaware approaches, six states
provide express penalties in the event a benefit corporation fails to file a
report within the applicable statutory period. These enforcement
mechanisms can be grouped into three basic categories: (1) legal
proceeding (with or without express provision for attorney fees); (2) loss
of the use of benefit corporation status (with or without a fine for
reinstatement); and (3) administrative dissolution.12
In the legal proceeding category, Minnesota allows shareholder
appraisal if the failure to file the benefit report is shown to be intentional.13
Nevada expressly allows a benefit enforcement proceeding for failure to
produce a benefit report and may allow attorney fees if the failure is
without justification.14 Similarly, Florida’s law allows a shareholder to
initiate a proceeding by requesting a copy of the benefit report and, if one
is so ordered, the court may require the benefit corporation to pay the
shareholders’ costs, including reasonable attorney fees.15
In the loss of status category, Massachusetts disallows holding the
entity out publicly as a benefit corporation while delinquent on benefit
reporting.16 While Massachusetts does not appear to completely strip the
legal status from the benefit corporation, it does attempt to limit any
goodwill received from advertising the chosen entity type. Unfortunately,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366 (West 2013).
Id. (showing that use of a third-party standard and public posting of the report is
expressly allowed but not required); see also, Alicia E. Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit
Corporations 90 Days Out: Who's Opting in?, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 247, 275 (2014) (noting
the permissive nature of Delaware’s public benefit corporation reporting law).
12 Murray, supra note 5.
13 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2015); see also Brent J. Horton, Rising to Their Full
Potential: How A Uniform Disclosure Regime Will Empower Benefit Corporations, 9 HARV. BUS.
L. REV. 101, 127 (2019) (including Minnesota in a discussion of states with some express
enforcement of statutory reporting requirements).
14 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.190 (West 2014).
15 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 607.613 (West 2014).
16 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 16 (West 2013).
10
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Massachusetts does not make clear how a benefit corporation will be
punished if it continues to publicly hold itself out as a benefit corporation
during this period. Minnesota’s law more formally revokes the entity’s legal
status if it is 90 days or more overdue on filing its benefit report.17 As
might be expected, one study shows this requirement has led to one
hundred percent reporting compliance by Minnesota benefit corporations,
though it is unclear how many entities lost their status because of
noncompliance.18 Minnesota law allows easy reinstatement with payment
of a $500 fine within 30 days of the revocation.19 New Hampshire formally
strips benefit corporation status if the benefit corporation has not filed a
benefit report for two years, but allows the entity to regain its status,
without a fine, simply by filing the report.20
Finally, New Jersey law allows the secretary of state to
administratively dissolve benefit corporations that have not filed timely
benefit reports.21 The New Jersey law does not make clear if there are any
restrictions related to refiling.
While these statutory additions should be largely praised for
attempting to give some teeth to the reporting requirements, they could
be improved. Regarding legal proceedings, shareholders should not be the
only stakeholders with standing. Benefit reports are produced largely for
other stakeholders, as shareholders already have mechanisms like director
voting and derivative lawsuits to ensure that their needs are addressed.22 If
the benefit reports are costly to produce or hurt the companies’ image,
shareholders may prefer the reports not be produced, leaving other
stakeholders without a remedy. While the concern of frivolous litigation is
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2015).
Maxime Verheyden, Public Reporting by Benefit Corporations: Importance, Compliance, and
Recommendations, 14 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 37, 94 (2018) (“In Minnesota, compliance with
the reporting requirement was perfect for the active public benefit corporations. The
main difference with Oregon, Colorado, and Delaware is the fact that the Minnesota
statute creates a strong enforcement mechanism, namely, filing of the report with the
secretary of state’s office and revocation of the public benefit corporation status upon a
failure to do so.”)
19 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.301 (West 2015).
20 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78B.190 (West 2014).
21 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11 (West 2013); see also, Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit
Corporations-A Sustainable Form of Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 604 (2011)
(noting New Jersey’s rules around benefit corporation reporting enforcement).
22 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305(c)(2) (BENEFIT CORP. 2017); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 367 (West 2013).
17
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generally trotted forward in arguments against stakeholder standing, this
situation is easily avoided by the company simply providing the report
each year. Reasonable attorney’s fees should be included to ensure that
claims can be brought without great expense to the stakeholders.
Regarding loss of status, a $500 fine will be de minimis for some
companies. While a scaled fine based on revenue or shareholders may be
somewhat difficult to administrate, it would provide a more forceful
deterrent. The scaled fee that B Lab uses to certify companies may be a
useful standard, ranging from $1000 to $50,000 based on revenue.23 While
this is the cost of certification, not entity formation, the B Lab scaled fee
may represent the minimum value firms expect social enterprise marketing
to bring. Most consumers are not aware of the differences between a
benefit corporation and a Certified B Corporation so matching the benefit
report fine to the certification fee may be appropriate.24 Companies should
not be able to profit from the marketing value of the benefit corporation
form while also failing to produce the required reports showing the social
performance of the company.
Administrative dissolution or revocation of status is a useful
enforcement mechanism but may be overly harsh without significant
notice. Notice and fines for two years should be sufficient. Also, failure to
file benefit reports should not be an easy way for companies to escape the
benefit corporation entity form and stakeholders should reap the benefits
of the scaled fines.
Even with improved enforcement, the substance of the benefit
report requirements remains weak. The model legislation provides only
vague guidelines regarding an annual narrative about the pursuit of social
good.25 Specifically requiring that benefit corporations explain how their
products and services fill a social need neglected by traditional profitfocused corporations could be helpful. Under the current model benefit
B LAB, Sign Agreement and Pay Annual Fees, https://usca.bcorporation.net/certification
(last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
24
B
LAB,
Benefit
Corporations
&
Certified
B
Corps,
https://benefitcorp.net/businesses/benefit-corporations-and-certified-b-corps
(last
visited Feb. 7, 2022).
25 MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401 (BENEFIT CORP. 2017); see also, Brett H.
McDonnell, From Duty and Disclosure to Power and Participation in Social Enterprise, 70 ALA.
L. REV. 77, 96 (2018) (noting that the “reporting requirements leave it quite vague
regarding how to measure the impact on the various interests,” but highlighting the threat
of a lawsuit as a possible way to combat the “temptation to engage in greenwashing.”)
23
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corporation legislation, using a third-party standard for the report is
required, but there is virtually no guidance on sufficient standards other
than a few vague words like “comprehensive,” “credible,” and
“transparent.”26 As noted above, Delaware does not even require use of a
third-party standard in its benefit reporting, and only requires production
of a benefit report every two years.27 The legislative drafters, however, do
not deserve significant blame for the vague requirements of benefit
reporting because quantifying social good is quite difficult and a reporting
statute likely could not capture all the needed nuance in relatively limited
space.28 Given the difficulty of measuring social good, other mechanisms
for ensuring public benefit should be considered, and some of those
mechanisms are discussed below in the next part.
III.

BEYOND BENEFIT CORPORATION REPORTING

In previous work, I have suggested the adoption of stakeholder
representatives for large social enterprises.29 Under this proposal,
stakeholder representatives would be given power that tends to be
reserved for shareholders in traditional corporations. Stakeholder groups
would each elect a representative and collectively the stakeholder
representatives would exercise rights such as electing directors, suing
directors, and bringing books and records actions. The argument is that
this shift in accountability from shareholders to all stakeholders (including
shareholders) would appropriately shift the attention of directors of social
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (BENEFIT CORP. 2017).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366 (West 2013) (use of a third-party standard is permitted
but not required under Delaware law).
28 Ofer Eldar, Designing Business Forms to Pursue Social Goals, 106 VA. L. REV. 937, 940
(2020) (“The problem is that it is extremely difficult to verify companies' social impact.
Existing measures of social impact tend to be vague, include metrics that are difficult to
quantify, and even mix shareholder protection metrics with environmental or societal
ones. But if measurement is rarely available, how do we know that firms are pursuing
social goals effectively?”); cf, Emilie Aguirre, Beyond Profit, 54 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2077,
2128 (2021) (noting “[s]ome accounts claim that the lack of robust social impact metrics
is because it is too difficult to quantify social impact. But progress in sustainability metrics
provides a counter-example. For example, SASB has developed robust, largely
generalizable metrics that are gaining traction as the gold standard in assessing company
performance in sustainability.”)
29 See generally, J. Haskell Murray, Adopting Stakeholder Advisory Boards, 54 AM. BUS. L.J. 61
(2017).
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enterprises. This suggestion would keep a single board of directors and
would likely lead to less bureaucracy than codetermination proposals with
multiple boards.30 In this proposal, each director would see herself as a
champion for all stakeholders rather than as an advocate or defender of a
single group.31
One additional way to ensure benefit corporation leaders are
committed to social good is to cap the executive to employee pay ratio.
With the current lax requirements on benefit corporations, entrepreneurs
may use the entity form as pure marketing while doing virtually no social
good. A cap on executive pay, as a ratio to typical employee pay, would
significantly limit the exploitative uses of social enterprise. In large
companies, executive pay is now over 300 times the average employee’s
wage.32 While social enterprises should not be forced to have their
executives reduce their pay to the lowest employees’ wage, as Dan Price
famously did at Gravity Payments, a 10:1 or even a 50:1 cap seems
reasonable.33 If benefit corporations are formed primarily to benefit
See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Codetermination in Theory and Practice, 73 FLA.
L. REV. 321, 347-49 (2021) (claiming that conflict is not increased in German
codetermination but noting additional boards and meetings).
31 E. Norman Veasey, Christine T. Di Guglielmo, How Many Masters Can A Director Serve?
A Look at the Tensions Facing Constituency Directors, 63 BUS. LAW. 761, 765 (2008) (“Where
the interests of various constituencies do diverge–that is, where the corporation's
interests do not serve as well as a proxy for the interests of the stockholding body as a
whole, as in some ‘end game’ or ‘bet the company’ scenarios–a constituency director may
need to evaluate whether that divergence may subject the director to a conflict. And if
so, the director will need to consider what the director's course of action should be to
‘do the right thing’ as well as to avoid liability. In undertaking that evaluation, the director
must first consider to whom he owes fiduciary duties. That question underlies the
potential tension that constituency directors face in fulfilling both their fiduciary duties
and their obligations to their constituencies.”); accord Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the
Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 309, 343 (2013) (also
noting conflicts faced by constituency directors).
32 Lawrence Mishel and Jori Kandra, CEO compensation surged 14% in 2019 to $21.3 million
CEOs now earn 320 times as much as a typical worker, ECON. POL’Y INST., Aug. 18, 2020,
https://www.epi.org/publication/ceo-compensation-surged-14-in-2019-to-21-3million-ceos-now-earn-320-times-as-much-as-a-typical-worker/ (“using the realized
measure of CEO compensation, CEOs of major U.S. companies earned 21 times as much
as the typical worker in 1965. This ratio grew to 31-to-1 in 1978 and 61-to-1 by 1989. It
surged in the 1990s, hitting 366-to-1 in 2000.”).
33 Stephanie Hegarty, The boss who put everyone on 70K, BBC, Feb. 28, 2020,
https://www.bbc.com/news/stories-51332811 (“In 2015, the boss of a card payments
company in Seattle [Dan Price] introduced a $70,000 minimum salary for all of his 120
staff - and personally took a pay cut of $1m [to $70,000].”).
30
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society, executives should not balk at making “only” fifty times as much
as their average employee. This one requirement would seriously signal to
the market that benefit corporations are not just different in rhetoric, but
they are also different in a practice that is quite important and personal to
corporate leaders.
CONCLUSION
While state statutes have begun improving upon the almost
nonexistent enforcement mechanisms around benefit corporation
reporting, the current statutes remain insufficient to protect the interest of
stakeholders. This essay suggests stakeholder standing for benefit
enforcement proceedings regarding reporting, scaled fines for reporting
noncompliance, and ultimately loss of benefit corporation status with
significant payments to stakeholders. Still, even if reporting compliance
improves the substantive requirements, these reports are vague and
capturing the nuance of social good may be impossible. To address the
difficulties of encouraging social good through reporting this essay
suggests increasing stakeholder power in corporate governance and
addressing executive/employee pay disparities. These proposed solutions
are unlikely to ensure that benefit corporations will create social good, but
they should go a long way toward checking executive power and reducing
the temptation of financial exploitation.

